Mediatization is emerging as an influential new concept that places the media at the centre of all kinds of important cultural, political and social developments. However, it has so far attracted little critical evaluation. In this article the authors identify three areas of concern, namely, how causal processes are thought about, how historical change is understood, and how concepts are designed. It is hoped this article will contribute to the development of mediatization by generating critical debate and reflection, to prevent the term from being applied so inconsistently and indiscriminately that it becomes a 'concept of no difference'.
policy making, performance, consumption, madness, death, intimate relationships, human geography and education.
As Livingstone has already noted (2009), this is the second incarnation of the term, being initially coined by historians to describe processes of imperial deputation, whereby heads of conquered states retained vestigial sovereign powers through which they mediated the will of their imperial controllers (e.g. Vonoreradovich, 1965; Broers, 2001; Klueting, 2008 ). This original usage described processes of disempowerment, whereas the more recent invocation describes the accrual of power created by the increased pervasiveness and autonomy of media institutions, values and technologies. In essence, these factors no longer mediate power, they constitute it and it is this proposition that is used to justify the need for this new nominalization to replace the old descriptive workhorse of 'mediation' (e.g. Hjavard, 2008: 14; Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 250, Cottle, 2006: 9) .
The concept has an undeniable rhetorical value for communication and media scholars, as the term places media analysis at the centre of all kinds of important developments. But does it have any conceptual rigour, and are there unforeseen risks in automatically centre-staging media actors, logics and technologies? The term implies a process of historical change, but how is this conceptualised and analysed and is there any agreement as to when mediatization started and where things currently stand? There has already been some criticism of the concept (see for example, Couldry, 2008; Witschge, 2014) ; and this article seeks to add to this critical debate and reflection, which seems to have become lost in an unseemly rush to proclaim the mediatization of 'this-and-that'.
What's in a name?
While it is perhaps not surprising that there is no single definition of mediatization, definitions in the leading studies on the concept tend to fall into one of two camps, labelled by Hepp (2013) as 'institutionalist' and 'social-constructivist' (for related discussions, see also Hepp 2013, Hoskins, 2009 ). In institutionalist accounts, mediatization is seen as a process in which non-media social actors have to adapt to 'media's rules, aims, production logics, and constraints' (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999:249; Hjarvard, 2008 Hjarvard, , 2009 ). In social constructivist accounts, it is seen as a process in which changing information and communication technologies (ICTs) drive 'the changing communicative construction of culture and society' (Hepp, 2013: 616: see also, Couldry and Hepp, 2013; Krotz, 2009 ). The word 'media' in mediatization, therefore, differs in each tradition, with the former emphasising 'big' media organisations and their centripetal power, and the latter 'small' media and their centrifugal presence. In this respect we can detect the influence of different intellectual heritages, in one, the work of Altheide and Snow and in the other, medium theorists like Innis and McLuhan (see Lundby, 2009 for a full discussion).
To ascertain the extent to which these approaches have filtered into the literature we conducted a word search of 14 leading mainstream media and communication journals 1 from 2002 to 2012. The search identified every article mentioning mediatization and found 93 articles that mentioned the term at least once (book reviews and articles where the word appeared in the references only were excluded).
However, in the vast majority of cases (81 percent) the word was just mentioned in passing, more casually invoked than defined and operationalized with no clear reference as to which type of mediatization was being referred to (this is a tendency previously noted by Strömbäck, 2011b) . This absence suggests there is a routine imprecision, even conflation, in the use of the term by many authors, which is a recipe for confusion and can only degrade the analytical value of the term.
Contemplating causal processes
Where articles presented theoretical discussion and/ or primary empirical research, the majority inclined towards the social constructivist rather than institutionalist approach (10 to 3) (Elmelund-Praestekaer et al., 2011; Fortunati, 2005; Jansson, 2002; Kepplinger, 2002; Kunelius and Reunanen, 2012; Peleg and Bogoch, 2012; Reich, 2005; Schrøder, and Phillips, 2007; Schulz et al., 2005; 2011a. compared to Hopmann and Strömbäck, 2010; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011; van Aelst, et al., 2008) . What both conceptualisations of 'mediatization' share is a tendency to identify 'the media' (however defined) as causal historical agents. operate alongside other processes (see Adams and Jansson, 2012; Hjarvard, 2008; Hartmann, 2009; Krotz; research is undeveloped and the causal theorising common in other social science disciplines has not found its way into common assumptions about how causal processes operate here.
Our third point concerns changing communicative practice -and more specifically the reaction to media logic. Here we are confronted by a narrow set of possible behavioural responses to the agents of mediatization. The supposition is that all political actors adapt to, internalize, and accommodate media logic (Billig, 2013: 111) . For example, Mazzoleni and Schulz, (1999) observe political institutions adapt to the 'rules, aims, production logics, and constraints' employed by mass communicators' (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999:249) . In Strömbäck's third phase of mediatization political institutions adapt to media logic and in the fourth phase they internalise media logic (2008) . However, we would suggest that a broader range of possible responses needs to be considered. For example, Schulz observes that in the 'evolving new media environment' political actors may well choose to 'bypass the mass media and use their own channels for directly communicating ' (2004:95) .
Another response might be to seek to control the media. When faced with 'a media environment that is perceived as omnipresent and influential' political actors may well seek to manage it rather than adapt to it. As Maurer and Pfetsch (2014) observe, 'instead of adopting media logic, politicians can leverage the advantage they retain with regards to information that is interesting to journalists, professionalize their news management, and intensify their efforts to manipulate journalists' (2014: 342).
Governments and states, for example, have a number of options at their disposal, they can respond by regulating agents of mediatization or censoring them in various ways -on both subjects there is a large literature. In non-democracies a response like censorship maybe a relatively common first reaction, as a regime seek to maintain its authority. There are of course other responses, our point here is that a broader range of possible reactions to the presence of media logic need to be more fully explored.
Our fourth point relates to explaining the absence of an outcome in a situation where we might reasonably expect it to be present -namely why communicative practice does not change in situations where we presumed it would. This might seem to defy common sense, if you are interested in explaining why mediatization occurs why would you examine cases where it does not occur? However, such instances, we argue, are highly insightful. They tell us about possible constraints that might inhibit the mediatization process. If the agents of mediatization are present and the expected outcome is absent then it is important to explain this absence. Factors that retard processes are just as important as enabling factors in understanding the development of a process. These deviant cases, so to speak, may serve as an antidote to the tendency to see mediatization as an inexorable and ubiquitous process.
Comparisons over time and space?
One of the central challenges of all process-focused scholarship is to capture and explain change over time. Mediatization is a term that, by its very structure, implies historical change: i.e. there is something or someone that is becoming ever more '-ized'. This offers a further explanation for the dissatisfaction of its advocates with the term mediation, which could be seen to emphasise the media's role in continuity (what we used to term 'social and cultural reproduction').
Most authors see mediatization processes as emerging over a long period of (2004) speculates that we may be witnessing the end of 'mediatization', due to the declining dominance of traditional mainstream media and the rise of 'new' media (although he goes on to offer three different scenarios that respectively confirm, ameliorate or confound such a conclusion). Hepp notes mediatization 'is a cumulative process in which the variety of media with different institutionalizations and reifications increase over time. ' (2013:620-21; 2009: 143) , but also argues that media change far from being linear has 'eruptive moments' or 'mediatization waves ' (2013:625) . He provides examples such as 'emergence of print' and 'the recent phenomenon of digitalization ' (2013:625) . Hoskins argues we need to conceive of two distinct phases of mediatization, the first relating to the institutionalist definition mentioned previously (' the forms, practices and experiences associated with the dominant media and institutions of the broadcast era, and particularly television' [Hoskins, 2009: 148] ), the second concerning the social constructivist definition and the 'much more immediate and extensive interpenetration' of new forms of digital media (ibid.).
Hoskins seems to suggest that these different types of mediatization should be conceived of as sequential (see also Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2010: 17-18 of reasonable qualifications about these phases, in particular that these phases do not necessarily coincide with any specific time periods but more abstractly are stages of the mediatization process. This lack of consensus about the emergence and development of the mediatization process, while unsurprising, points to the problems of speculation and the need for systematic research of historical change.
As part of our review of leading journals, we assessed the extent to which scholars utilising the concept actually sought to make temporal comparisons in a systematic way. Our results showed that, all of the 13 articles that carried out any primary empirical work on the concept discussed change over time, but the majority (7) demonstrated a 'synchronous' research strategy (Hepp, 2013: 624) , that is, their research focused on a single time period (Fortunati, 2005; Jansson, 2002; Kunelius and Reunanen, 2012; Peleg, and Bogoch, 2012; Schrøder, and Phillips, 2007; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011; van Aelst, et al., 2008) . Of the remainder that attempted a 'diachronous' strategy (ibid.), two studies focused on two periods (Reich, 2005; Elmelund-Praestekaer, et al., 2011) ; one on four periods (Schulz et al., 2005) and one, five periods (Hopmann and Strömbäck, 2010) . Only one study examined temporal change over a substantial time period and at a large number of temporal junctures (Kepplinger, 2002) .
There may well be other diachronic studies outside these leading English language journals but we believe these results serve as a good indicator of research focus and suggest that much mediatization research depends on a presumption rather than demonstration of historical change, projecting backwards from contemporary case studies rather than carefully designed temporal comparisons.
Some theorists appear to argue this is not problematic, indeed, that any attempt at temporal comparison is a fundamentally flawed endeavour. For example, Hepp asserts that recognizing mediatization as a 'meta process' means it '…is not an empirical process in the sense that we can investigate it as -for example-a certain talk or a person crossing the street. "Meta-processes" are superior theoretical approaches describing long -term processes of change. So a "meta-process" cannot be researched empirically as a single transformation. ' (2009: 140) We have reservations about such statements, which seem to see mediatization as inexorable yet ineffable. As mediatization is a concept that presupposes historical change, scholars that invoke it cannot afford to be incurious about charting its emergence and momentum. We accept that mediatization encompasses multi-faceted and long term processes that could never be captured A similarly mixed picture emerged in a more recent comparative analysis of two decades of election campaign coverage in Danish and German TV news. The authors concluded that the study only found evidence of mediatization in relation to 3 of its 5 measures and that the process has apparently stalled since the 1990s (Zeh and Hopmann, 2013) .
This kind of evidence is important in two respects. It challenges the presumption across both 'traditions' that mediatization is a continuous and linear process (see Couldry, 2008 : 375 for an earlier critique on this point). Diachronic theorizing needs to be able to accommodate the possibility of abeyance, as well as accretion and acceleration (see Streeck and Thelen, 2005) . This critical distinction seems to be particularly neglected in discussions surrounding the diffuse impact of (Knightley, 1975: 205) . What is also often not appreciated is that it was a media event and would never have had this symbolic resonance were it not for the chance proximity international journalists on the scene, who witnessed the immediate aftermath and were able to cable their reports on their return to Bilbao.
These reports sparked an immense, intense, international propaganda war, which directly involved senior editors, journalists, diplomats and eventually governments.
One can even detect acknowledgement of the significance of the media's role in Pablo Picasso's famous depiction of the attack (Deacon, 2008: 29-32, 178-179) . In sum, Guernica offers a classical example of the media exerting a 'reverse effect' as well as a sophisticated and widespread recognition of the power of the media to frame political and public perceptions. It reveals that the Mediatization of war has more of a prehistory than seems to be supposed within much of the recent literature.
Alongside this need to develop more rigorous temporal comparisons is an accompanying need to incorporate spatial comparisons. There has been some illuminating work done on this (see Zeh and Hopmann, 2013; Dimitrova, 2011 and Maurer and Pfetsch, 2014 ) but more multi-country studies on mediatization are needed if we are to understand fully the drivers and inhibitors of these processes across countries.
A concept of no difference?
We have already commented upon the portability and varying definitions of the mediatisation concept. Krotz sees this as an advantage, observing that mediatization helps us think of specific events and developments as belonging together (2009: 25) but we suggest this is problematic because of the important role concepts play in empirical research. According to Giovanni Sartori concepts are not just labels they are also 'data containers ' (1970: 1039) . Mediatization, although a process, can also be seen as a container in which observations can be collected.
However, such containers need to be well defined if they are to exert 'discriminatory power' and perform more than 'allusive function' (ibid.). While some might argue that mediatization is sensitizing concept, in our opinion such concepts are more blinding than guiding. The imprecise application of the term 'mediatization' means it resembles what Sartori calls, a universal concept of no difference, a container in which different things can be placed. In part this might explain its success: it travels well, scholars working in different areas of communication and media studies and beyond can use it, the down side is we cannot distinguish between occurrences of mediatization. Mediatization, to use Sartori's words, is something akin to the 'the Hegelian night in which all the cows look black (and eventually the milkman is taken for a cow) ' (1970: 1040) . Sartori is not opposed to universal concepts, in fact he argues they play an important role in the social sciences, however, the aim is to design concepts that have enough discriminatory power to avoid making the unlike alike (Sartori, 1970) . (1970:1041) . At the low level a concept is tightly defined, 'the differentiae of individual settings… is sacrificed to accuracy of connotation ' (1970: 1041) .
The most obvious solution to the lack of discriminatory power is to descend the ladder, provide a definition which has more attributes and more potential falsifiers. Alternatively, scholars can leave mediatization as a universal concept but develop a series of additional concepts at lower levels of abstraction, in other words, construct a family of connected concepts along the ladder. Strömbäck and Esser (2014) , for example, propose three sub-dimensions to news media logic:
professionalism, commercialism and media technology. Schulz (2004) identifies four sub-concepts of mediatization: extension, substitution, amalgamation and accommodation. Each of these might also function as a medium level concept.
Indeed, he notes his aim is to 'reconstruct the mediatization concept in order to probe its implicit suppositions and its heuristic value ' (2004:88) .
However, one important point needs to be made about keeping mediatization as a universal concept. Sartori observes it is vital that such concepts are empirical universals with discriminatory power and not pseudo-universals. Pseudo-universals are concepts without boundaries that perform an 'allusive function'. Empirical universals, in contrast, have 'at least one relatively precise (attribute) ' (1970:1042) .
This discriminatory power can be achieved by saying what a concept is not. In contrast, a concept defined without negation has no boundaries. 'A concept qualified by negation may, or may not be found to apply to the real world; whereas a nonbounded concept always applies ' (1970:1042) . Mediatization is currently a pseudo universal that needs to become an empirical universal. We need to know what it is not. Unless we can differentiate between the changes in communicative practice involving the media that are instances of mediatization and those that are not then it will remain a pseudo-universal and researchers will discover the process everywhere.
Sartori's approach is not without its problems (see Goertz, 2006) , but it points to fundamental flaws with the way mediatization is currently constructed and highlights the importance of concept design. It could be that some scholars do not want to descend the ladder and carefully operationalize mediatization, preferring the comfortable generality of the world of no difference. In our view, the failure to develop discriminatory focus will mean that 'mediatization' remains little more than a tag which will inevitably mean that misgathering occurs and confusion reigns.
Conclusion
In this article we have identified some of our concerns regarding the use and conceptualisation of mediatization. In summary, they point to three areas of concern, the first has to do with assumptions about power and causation; the second, relates to researching historical processes and the third concept design. The way mediatization is currently understood is too simplistic for a number of reasons. It is an account of change that driven by a narrow set of causal variables -the mass media and/or ICTs -which are seen as powerful enough on their own to bring about change over time. As we have argued, there is a tendency to see these agents of mediatization as both necessary and sufficient to bring about change in all contexts.
The role of non-media factors in jointly influencing changing communicative practice is largely overlooked. What is missing, we argue, in this media centric narrative of change is a full appreciation of joint sufficiency. Further, we argued that current research tends to focus on too narrow a set of outcomes and has overlooked the absence of mediatization in contexts where the causal conditions are present and we would reasonably expect it to occur.
In relation to theorising and researching change over time, we noted a number of outstanding issues. While most authors see mediatization as a continuous process emerging over a long period of time there is little consensus on when it started and some even suggest it might have ended. There is clearly a need for more diachronous research demonstrating rather than presuming historical change, indeed, the diachronous research that has been done seems to show mediatization may well be an erratic process. Our final criticism focused on the value added of concepts in the research process. Useful concepts allow us to discriminate, poorly designed concepts, in contrast, make the unalike alike. What light does mediatization shed on the process of social, political and cultural change? As a concept of no difference we suggest very little. What is the value added of this concept currently defined? In the survey of the literature on mediatization mentioned earlier, we asked a simple question, if you removed the word mediatization completely from each article how many would still make sense? The answer was in the vast majority (75 out of 93) it would not make any difference. The danger here is that if these issues are not addressed, mediatization, instead of illuminating our understanding of social, political and cultural transformation, will serve to confuse, leading to a morass of conceptually muddled research in which mediatization is all things and everywhere.
